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Abstract:
The Asia-Pacific region is expected to be the main region of growth in airline travel for
at least the next two decades. According to the forecasts, China will become one of the
largest domestic airline markets in the world alongside Japan, already one of the most
significant domestic markets outside the USA.
The inability of government-owned airlines in the region to cope with rapid growth and
with the need to upgrade their services in domestic markets has resulted in major
changes in policy. As a result, new airlines have been permitted to operate in South
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, India, Nepal and Pakistan with governments
adopting a more liberal attitude towards competition. A common experience has been
that the new airlines cannot survive on a domestic base and a number of countries have
allowed the new carriers to fly international routes.
These new airlines are more likely to fly between regional centres and so take away
some of the pressures on the key hub airports that tend to be congested. Also, they
provide direct links to tourist attractions away from the main metropolitan centres in
Australia. This paper analyses these trends in aviation in the Asian region and explores
their implications for the continuing development of Asian markets by Australian
airlines and the tourism sector.
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1. Competition in the Airline Industry - Australia and its
Neighbours
Australia entered the 1980’s with an aviation policy that preserved trunk routes in its
domestic market for two airlines competing on a controlled basis and an emphasis on
the commercial viability of Qantas as the sole national carrier in international
markets. Over the coming decade, there were significant changes in the attitude of
successive Federal Governments and changes in policy resulted in a more dynamic
industry with much reduced distinctions between domestic and international airline
operations, at least as far as Australian carriers are concerned. The pressures that were
building up during the 1980’s included expectations of gains to Australian consumers
in a more competitive airline industry, aggressive competition from carriers in South-
East Asia, the USA’s insistence on increasing opportunities for its carriers, and
recognition of the importance of international tourism to Australia. At the same time,
Australia was committed to a path of microeconomic reform. The result is that
Australia has a deregulated domestic airline industry, it has established a mechanism
to allocate commercial rights to operate on international routes to its own carriers, and
its approach to international aviation encourages competition where this is likely to
generate benefits to the nation as a whole.
The Australian experience is being mirrored across Asia and there is a common
interest in pursuing opportunities for new carriers to gain access to international
markets. Moreover, ‘multiple designation’ is one of the measures being advocated as
part of a package of reform that will lead to a more competitive international airline
industry. For example, the Transportation Working Group of APEC has tabled a
paper on the subject for consideration at the Ministers of Transport in June 1997. The
paper points out that the growth in the number of airlines providing services in the
region enhances competition and results in greater range of services for consumers.
The question is posed whether APEC should endorse the concept of multiple
designation, or at least member economies could promote conditions that would allow
their APEC partners to designate more than one carrier. The Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council (PECC 1995) has promoted similar initiatives.
The continual pressure of competition has been the most potent agent of change in the
international regulatory framework. The aggressive approach of newer airlines
seeking to cement a position in international markets has made attempts to control the
industry more and more difficult to achieve and several nations, notably the USA,
have been ardent advocates of a more liberal approach. Many governments have
abandoned attempts to regulate fares and there has been a consistent trend towards the
active promotion of competition. Under the auspices of the Uruguay Round of GATT
(General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) and ICAO (International Civil Aviation
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Organisation), there have been wide-ranging debates about appropriate regulatory
structures. Multilateralism, a fundamental principle promoted by the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), has been rejected thus far in aviation (Nuutinen 1992, Findlay
1997). Nevertheless, multiple designation and rapid growth in traffic is placing
pressure on the bilateral system and there is increasing interest in regional
arrangements.
This paper examines the trend towards multiple designation of airlines in Asia where
rapid growth of traffic and economic pressures on the airline industry have not
provided opportunities for the same type of public debate and gradual process of
change that occurred in Australia. However, the well-documented Australian
experience provides valuable insights into the factors leading to multiple designation
in Asia. The paper examines the Australian experience in some detail and then
analyses liberalisation of domestic airline markets in Asia citing the particular cases
of South Korea and the Philippines. New entrants tend to emerge because of
developments in domestic markets, but once they have made their presence felt, there
are irresistible pressures on governments to allow them to operate on international
routes.
Often, these new entrants are encouraged to develop new routes, particularly on a
regional basis, but the bilateral system of regulation is an inhibiting factor. There is
growing interest in forming regional groups, which agree to a more liberal approach
to airline operations within the membership, but it is possible these regional blocs
could become anti-competitive for outsiders. This could have implications for
Australia, especially in the formation of hubs and the roles that might be played by
Australian carriers in the increasingly global airline industry.
2. Australia’s Aviation Policy in the 1980’s and 1990’s
2.1 International Aviation
Despite several attempts to organise a multilateral framework for the conduct of
commercial aviation services, the system that has evolved is a complex web of more
than 3,000 air services agreements on a world-wide basis. Bilateral negotiations
establish how airline services between the respective countries will be regulated,
usually specifying which airlines are permitted to operate, what capacity they can
provide and what routes/airports they are permitted to use, and perhaps what fares can
be charged (Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics 1994).
Historically, Australia tended to have a restrictive approach to competition in its
Developments in the Aviation Industry in Australia and Asia
Hooper
3
negotiations. Since most of the travel to and from Australia was undertaken by
Australian residents, the right to enter the market was regarded as valuable
commercial property that should be exchanged only when there was some reciprocal
benefit.
Accordingly, Australia was reluctant to enter into air services agreements with other
countries that did not appear to have a significant volume of traffic. As an end-point
on the international network, Australia’s interests were seen to be served best by
having a strong carrier; foreign carriers provided sufficient competitive pressure and
multiple designation on Australia’s part would only weaken its position. The
Government’s stated position was that it aimed to have international services
provided at fares consistent with the public interest while protecting Qantas and the
Australian Government actively sought the advice of Qantas whenever air services
agreements were being negotiated.
In the early 1970’s, the commercial environment made it progressively more difficult
for governments to control fares as promotional fares proliferate as scheduled airlines
learned to cope with floating currency exchange rates and competition from charter
airlines (Lyle 1995). Australia, like many other countries, concentrated its attention
on controlling entry and on allocating capacity. However, during the 1980’s, there
were two major developments that resulted in a change in the Government’s attitude.
First, the Government committed itself to a comprehensive programme of
microeconomic reform with the transport sector high on the agenda (Hensher 1993).
A process of reviewing and reforming government regulation was commenced and
closer scrutiny was placed on government business enterprises. The trend was for the
Government to withdraw from activities that could be performed more efficiently by
the private sector. Nevertheless, aviation is treated as a ‘special sector’ in most
economies, especially given the difficulty of taking unilateral action in the
international arena. Changes in the Government’s aviation policy occurred only after
a considerable amount of investigation and debate.
The second major change was the recognition that tourism had become an important
sector of the Australian economy. For the first time, the number of international
visitors coming to Australia exceeded the number of Australian residents departing
the country (short-term stays). International tourism was going through a boom after a
number of factors had combined to create greater awareness of Australia and as a
weaker currency made Australia competitive as a tourist destination. At first, the
major growth markets included Europe and North America, but growing incomes and
changing attitudes to foreign holidays in Asia, coupled with supportive Government
policies saw Japan take a lead as a generator of visitors.
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The tourism sector was coalescing into a powerful industry group and it was raising
aviation policy as a serious constraint (Wheatcroft & Lipman 1989). A consistent
theme has been that the international tourism market is intensely competitive and that
Australia, as a long-haul destination, tends to be regarded as a costly alternative. The
Asia-Pacific region boasts some of the world’s most efficient airlines (Findlay 1985,
Forsyth 1997) and this makes it imperative for Australia to seek effective
arrangements for the provision of its airline services.
Recognising the growing importance of tourism and the need to devise appropriate
policies, the Government directed the Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) to
conduct an inquiry into the tourism. A vigorous debate ensued about the role and
importance of travel costs. The Australian Tourism Industry Association (ATIA) and
the Australian Federation of Travel Agents (AFTA) argued to the IAC that high travel
costs were deterring development of the market and this view was supported by
research reported by the Australian Tourist Commission (IAC 1989, 49). Qantas held
an opposing view that Australia ought to focus on ‘high-yield’ tourists. The IAC
considered there was scope to reduce costs and air fares under more competitive
conditions and that the economy-wide effects of this would be considerable. It
advocated a far-reaching agenda of reform to be implemented in several phases
including abandonment of the separation between domestic and international markets
for Australian carriers.
The day after the IAC’s draft report was released to the public (15 June 1989) the
Government announced a major shift in its international aviation policy. The Minister
for Transport and Communications indicated it was beneficial for Australia to have a
more liberal approach to the negotiation of air services agreements and that, in future,
the over-riding objectives would be to maximise the welfare of users and of Australia
as a whole. He said ‘The Government’s (IAC) review was particularly prompted by a
surge in inbound tourism last financial year. Because seats were scarce, not everyone
who wanted to travel to Australia was able to. The Government was determined to
ensure that Australia’s approach to negotiating aviation rights was able to meet the
growing demand for travel’ (Willis 1989). He noted that Australia’s airline market
had changed; Australia had become a major tourist and business destination and that
approaches that had been pursued in the past were no longer relevant. The IAC
advocated extension of the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade
Agreement (CER) to include aviation services. The Government acted on this by
entering into a joint study with New Zealand to assess the costs and benefits. The
study concluded that there were significant welfare gains to be made by creating a
single market (BTCE & NZ MoT 1991).
The next major change in policy occurred when the Minister for Transport and
Communications announced in February 1992 that reforms would be introduced to
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promote national interests and to enhance competition by removing barriers between
the domestic and international markets. Qantas now was able to sell spare capacity in
the domestic market. At the same time, domestic operators would be permitted to fly
on international routes. To achieve this, it was necessary to renegotiate air services
agreements, but it was necessary to devise a mechanism for allocating commercial
rights to any current and future Australian airlines. The  International Air Services
Commission (IASC) was formed to make decisions about capacity and renewal of
allocations, reviewing this decision and providing advice to the Minister on matters
related to international operations.
The Minister also said the Government would pursue the single aviation market with
New Zealand and, on 3 June 1992, the two governments had reached an agreement on
some of the major changes to Australia-New Zealand aviation. There appears to have
been a presumption on the Australian side that a merger of Air New Zealand and
Ansett Airlines should proceed, possibly because of the belief such a combination
would provide effective competition for Qantas on routes to and from Australia and
New Zealand (Findlay 1996). However, late in 1994 the Australian Government
decided not to proceed, largely because of concern about an adverse effect on the sale
price of Qantas, then in the process of being privatised. Ultimately, the single aviation
market has been established, but the impetus for this, and indeed for the changes in
policy in 1992, resulted more from the pressures building up in the domestic airline
industry in Australia.
2.2 Domestic Policy Responses
The Australian Government introduced economic regulation of the domestic airline
industry in the early 1950’s when the first attempts to develop a national network
appeared likely to result in a monopoly. The policy that evolved by 1954, and which
remained in place for more than three decades, avoided this outcome by fostering
limited competition between two airlines. The measures put in place prevented new
competitors emerging on the trunk routes, determined what capacity should be
provided and allocated this equally to the two airlines, and also decided what fares the
airlines could charge (May et al 1986, Bureau of Transport and Communications
Economics 1991).  The proponents of the policy argued that these arrangements
ensured Australia avoided ‘destructive’ or ‘wasteful’ competition among its airlines
and allowed for the orderly development of a national network.
When the USA deregulated its domestic airline industry in 1978, and several other
countries followed suit, it was perhaps inevitable that Australia would review its
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situation. New entrants in the USA had slashed fares, especially on longer routes and
this raised expectations that similar outcomes could be achieved in Australia. Since
1974 the Federal Government had set fares using a formula approach incorporating a
‘flag-fall’ and a ‘distance’ component. The premise was that there is a fixed cost per
passenger involved in making reservations, issuing a ticket, processing at the airport
and getting airborne, and there is a cost related to the distance traveled. The formula
used a linear relationship and it was recognised there was an element of cross-
subsidisation involved. However, during the late 1970’s, pressure built up to reduce
air fares on the longer routes which, by then, seemed high compared to fares charged
in the United States. When the Government commissioned an inquiry into domestic
air fares it found there was a widely-held opinion that air fares in Australia were too
high and that the structure was inequitable (Holcroft et al 1981). Although there is
evidence that a linear relationship exists between an airline’s direct operating costs
and distance, there are theoretical and practical grounds to question the
straightforward application of a formula approach (Gannon 1982).
As a result of these pressures, the Government made two important concessions when
it came time to renew the Airlines Agreement Act in 1981. It gave an undertaking to
assess the advantages and disadvantages of deregulating the domestic airline industry
prior to renewing the Airlines Agreement Act, and regional airlines were given some
scope to introduce jet aircraft and to expand their services to non-trunk routes. Fares
were to be regulated henceforth by the Independent Air Fares Committee (IAFC).
After September 1982, the IAFC set fares according a cubic formula that reduced
prices on long-haul and on short-haul routes while also introducing greater scope for
the airlines to introduce promotional discounts.
The independent East West Airlines (EWA) expanded its operations and ordered jet
aircraft. In an aggressive approach that pushed the regulations to the limits, it
commenced a de facto Melbourne-Sydney service via Albury in 1983. Using F27
turbo-prop aircraft and a ‘no frills’ approach to service, it initially set its fares at
around 50% of the applicable TAA and Ansett fare. The Government then found itself
in the position where it was unwilling to approve a large reduction in the price of
airline travel. This ‘experiment’ with competition attracted a considerable amount of
public attention and heightened interest when it came time in 1985 for the promised
review of policy. Known as the ‘May Review’, the inquiry received a large number of
submissions, the overwhelming majority arguing that the industry should be
deregulated (May et al 1986).
Those in favour of maintaining some form of regulation included the airlines, the
unions and the Department of Transport. The travel industry was critical of the
airlines for not taking a more active role in promoting tourism and for restricting the
options for other groups to introduce a wider and more attractive range of domestic
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travel packages. Other major opponents of the ‘two airline policy’ were the Federal
Government’s Treasury and Finance Departments and the State Governments across
the nation. When the inquiry’s report was published (May et al 1986), it agreed with
the view that too little effort had been devoted to the non-business market and that the
two airlines were too narrowly focused on serving the business travel market.
The ‘May Review’ set out the options for the Government, although it is notable that
it had been directed not to consider the privatisation of TAA. In October 1987, the
Federal Government, by now strongly committed to the pursuit of microeconomic
reform, chose the path of deregulation. The Government was obliged to give the
airlines three years notice, but after October 1990 the two established carriers would
be free to make independent commercial decisions. The IAFC was disbanded and the
Prices Surveillance Authority and the Trade Practices Commission became the
relevant regulatory bodies (now combined under the banner of the Australian
Competition & Consumer Commission). Also, as of July 1 1988, Qantas was
permitted to resume the carriage of passengers of other international airlines on the
domestic sectors of its services. The Government rejected the possibility of extending
the Closer Economic Relations Agreement with New Zealand to aviation services.
Both of the incumbents began to prepare for deregulation, including a change of name
for TAA to Australian Airlines. Both carriers increased their marketing activities and
ordered new aircraft as they enjoyed a surge in the travel market during the
Bicentennial and World Expo in Brisbane. When their pilots initiated industrial action
in support of a wage claim the airlines, with the backing of the Federal Government,
took an uncompromising stance and signaled a tougher approach to the control of
costs and the pursuit of productivity improvements. During the dispute, several
business groups were advancing their plans to start new airlines and Compass
Airlines, the eventual winner of this ‘contest’, found it was relatively easy to attract
qualified employees and to gather the support of the travel industry. Traffic levels had
begun to recover after the cessation of the pilots’ dispute, but real growth in the
market had begun to fall away just before the dispute had commenced. When it
started its first services in December 1990, Compass set its peak fares 20% and its
off-peak fares 50% below the level of its rivals. This was matched immediately and
Australian and Ansett introduced frequent flyer plans. Compass reduced its prices
even more in May of 1991 and a full-scale price war erupted. Traffic levels boomed,
especially on the longer routes and on those serving tourist destinations.
The subsequent failure of Compass was, in part, attributed to the inadequacy of
infrastructure at Australian airports to cater for new airlines. Although much of the
cause of Compass’ financial problems can be sheeted home to its business strategy
and lack of capital (Nyathi et al 1993), there have been concerns that the Australian
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market will not sustain more than two major airlines. Spurred on by the tourism sector
and its commitment to microeconomic reform the Federal Government has been
prepared to extend the reform agenda and to seek ways to increase competition.
The IAC’s inquiry into tourism was completed just prior to deregulation and its
package of recommended reforms applied as much to domestic aviation as it did to
the international airline sector. The IAC suggested the distinction between domestic
and international markets be reduced for Australian carriers and that a single aviation
market ought to exist for Australia and New Zealand. Both Qantas and Australian
Airlines had submitted that Government ownership impeded their ability to compete,
but the IAC placed primary importance on the creation of a competitive environment.
Nevertheless, the issue of privatisation of the Government’s two airlines had been
placed on the agenda.
2.3 Privatisation and the Formation of a Single Market with New
Zealand
In November 1996, the Australian and New Zealand Governments finally signed an
agreement allowing designated carriers to fly within and between the two countries
provided they are at least 50% owned and controlled by nationals of either country.
However, this occurred only after other events had overtaken the policy making
process.
Despite having excluded privatisation as an option in 1985 for the May Review, by
1991 the Government had accepted the desirability of privatising Qantas and
Australian. Options considered along the way included partial privatisation of each
airline as separate entities, but the Government decided in the end that both its airlines
should be merged first and then sold as a unified business. Announcing this in 1991,
the Government indicated it would broaden the scope for other Australian airlines to
operate international services. In September 1992, Qantas acquired Australian
Airlines saying that it planned to create ‘a seamless domestic and international airline
service’ and, by October of 1993, Australian was no longer being promoted as a
separate entity. Also, the Government had given its permission for Qantas to begin
selling its spare capacity on the domestic sectors of its international flights, a step
taken by the carrier in November of 1993. British Airways was permitted to purchase
25% of Qantas in March 1993 and by November of 1995, the privatisation process
was completed.
Australian Airlines had expanded its fleet in 1990 and Qantas continued to increase
its capacity, allowing it to add routes, particularly within Western Australia
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(Australian Airlink). By July 1995, it was able to offer half hour headways on its
dense east coast markets in peak periods. Ansett Airlines’ ability to respond to the
competition was limited, partly because it was having difficulty controlling costs with
its fleet configuration. Both of Ansett’s owners, TNT and News Corporation, had
signaled their interest in selling their equity stake, with TNT unable because of its
financial problems to provide the capital required for expansion into international
markets. Lacking international experience, the attraction of Air New Zealand
becoming an owner was attractive.
However, the market was running ahead of policy. The Australian Government had
vetoed plans to proceed with a single aviation market late in 1994, but throughout
1995 negotiations proceeded for the sale of the News Corporation share of Ansett to
Air New Zealand. There were additional complicating factors. One was that Ansett
Airlines provided the only domestic competition to Air New Zealand and the
Commerce Commission of New Zealand was opposed to the sale. The eventual
outcome was a commitment by News Corporation to Ansett Australia with an
injection of capital and the sale of TNT’s half share to Air New Zealand. News
Corporation purchased Air New Zealand and operates it as a separate entity.
Another complicating factor was the rules on foreign ownership. Australia had set the
limits of foreign ownership at 49% in the sale of Qantas, with a foreign-owned airline
limited to 25%. Ansett Airlines International had been awarded routes by the
Government that now could be in breach of the air services agreements under which
they were awarded, specifically those with Japan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea. The solution was to pass control of Ansett
Airlines International to Australian investors (AMP and County Natwest Australia),
and the New Zealand Commerce Commission and the Australian Foreign Investment
Review Board approved the sale.
In agreeing to the formation of a single aviation market between Australia and New
Zealand, it can be argued the Australian Government was giving recognition to an
arrangement that had come into being by virtue of the cross-ownership arrangements.
Within a decade, Government policy had turned completely on its head. The domestic
industry was deregulated, the airlines were privatised, foreign ownership restrictions
were eased, the Australian and New Zealand aviation markets were unified, and
multiple designation was accepted. Moreover, the Government became an open
advocate of competition in international markets.
Developments in the Aviation Industry in Australia and Asia
Hooper
10
2.4 Multiple Designation and Advocacy of Competition
With hindsight, it is interesting to reflect on public statements made by the various
interest groups to the IAC in 1989. Qantas argued it was ‘the only airline in the world
without any domestic network to feed its overseas flights and to link its incoming
traffic to a wide network with low add on fares’. Having said that, it quickly
dismissed any interpretation that it wished to compete on a wider basis in the
domestic market. Australian Airlines, stating its desire to operate regional
international services, said ‘... domestic operations by Qantas are an appendage to its
main business, a business that is protected because it is the sole designated carrier’.
Ansett Airlines submitted it would be at a disadvantage were Qantas to be given
access to its markets without reciprocal rights for Ansett to compete on Qantas’
international routes. Indeed, the Australian Government expressed the view that ‘to
allow Qantas to perform such a role (carrying domestic passengers) Ö would
undoubtedly lead to pressure for other domestic operators to be allowed to operate as
designated international Australian carriers, which pressure would be difficult for the
Government, on grounds of fair and equitable commercial opportunity, to resist’ (IAC
1989, 77-79).
Given these arguments, it was impossible for the Government to merge its two
airlines and allow them to integrate their domestic and international operations and
then to privatise this entity while continuing to deny Ansett Airlines, or any other new
entrants, the right to fly internationally. In February of 1992, the Government took the
logical step of approving multiple designation. To implement the change in policy,
though, it was necessary first to renegotiate air services agreements and set up an
independent process to allocate operating rights.
The IASC has been given several directives. One is to promote greater economic
efficiency in the airline industry and competition among Australian carriers. Added to
this, its determinations should result in airlines responding to the needs of consumers
while supporting Australian tourism and trade. In permitting a new entrant into a
market, the IASC has to assess whether the level of capacity allocated is consistent
with the development of commercially sustainable operations by the entrant and the
incumbent Australian carrier when they operate efficiently. ‘Commercial
sustainability’ is defined for this purpose as the minimum capacity necessary to allow
a level of scheduled international passenger services consistent with an efficient,
commercially sustainable operation. The problematic issue here is on the definition of
the market.
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The IASC has interpreted the relevant market as the traffic between the two countries.
Findlay and Round (1994) argue that airlines tend to approach their marketing plans
by looking at groups of countries. Currently, regulators in the USA, the UK and the
European Commission have a major disagreement over just such an issue (Anon.
1996). The proposed alliance between American Airlines and British Airways,
according to the proponents, has a minor share of the market between North America
and Europe. At issue is whether the proposed alliance’s domination of traffic flowing
through Heathrow Airport is a serious threat to competition (Odell 1997, Alamdari &
Morrell 1997). The bilateral approach to negotiation of air services agreements
constrains the way regulators and airlines consider markets, but the trend towards
globalisation of airline services will pose increasingly difficult issues for regulatory
bodies such as the IASC.
A related issue is how the IASC determines what is commercially sustainable. Its
approach has been to take account of the importance of network characteristics and of
the potential for economies of scope. Also, it has considered the size of the network
of the applicant, the size of the network of the incumbents, the degree of competition
on the route, the nature of the traffic, the ability to match aircraft type with demand
characteristics, and revenue and cost characteristics of the route. As a result, the IASC
is confronted with a difficult task that is growing in complexity and it lacks wider
powers necessary to promote competition (Findlay and Round 1994).
The Australian experience over the past decade illustrates the power of market forces
as an agent of change it shows that interventionist regulations will continue to be
under pressure. It is unlikely these competitive forces will abate as new airlines vie
for a share of the market and as the world’s major airlines seek global network
coverage of through their alliances and equity investments. Only the USA has a
consistent policy on the formation of these ‘mega’ alliances. Alliances are acceptable
provided they operate under an ‘open skies’ regime and if dominant positions on less
competitive routes are weakened. The formation of alliances between carriers on
either side of the Atlantic has given the USA the lever with which to negotiate very
liberal air services agreements with ten European nations (Odell 1997). The USA is
driving home the advantage and it is pursuing a similar approach in Asia (Ballantyne
1997, Jennings 1996).
According to one line of argument, the major airlines will determine the location of
key hub airports and the lesser airlines will be relegated to feeder roles (Shenton
1996). From Australia’s point of view, the emerging alliance between American
Airlines and British Airways ensures Qantas is part of a powerful bloc. However, if
this comes at the price of Qantas being relegated over time to being a feeder airline
there are important implications for Australia (Bureau of Transport Economics and
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Policy 1994). Before considering that possibility, an overview of the policy and
competitive environment in Asia will demonstrate there are countervailing forces.
3. The Coming Era of the Asia-Pacific Airline Industry
3.1 The Pragmatic Asian Approach
It is difficult to find situations anywhere in the world where governments promoted
open competition in their domestic airline markets prior to the late 1970’s. In part, the
reason for this has been the fear of control over the industry by monopolies or of
persistent financial crises resulting from ‘destructive’ competition. Asian nations have
shared these concerns, but in addition they still rely upon their domestic airlines to
compensate for a sub-standard or congested surface transport system, to overcome the
barriers of mountains or water.
Another common factor is that the economic boom in Asia and the growth in
international tourism are generating rapid and sustained increases in airline traffic. It
has been predicted that Asian carriers, not including Japan’s, will account for one in
eight revenue passenger kilometres (RPK’s) performed by the world’s domestic
carriers in 2014 (McDonnell-Douglas 1995). China’s market is expected to grow at an
average annual rate of more than 11% for several decades with the result that its
carriers will perform more than 100,000 million RPK’s in 2014 (Boeing 1995).
Carriers from Japan and China will have substantial domestic markets exceeded only
in the USA.
Governments have recognised their unreliable and under-resourced airline systems
inhibit the development of their tourism sectors, now one of the most promising
sectors of their economies. The initial step away from the strictly regulated approach
has been to permit the entry of private sector airlines and there has been no shortage
of business interests prepared to take up the challenge (Bailey 1993). However, the
economic realities of the airline industry progressively make it more and more
difficult to sustain controls over entry, capacity and fares (Hooper et. al. 1996). One
of the most problematic aspects of liberalisation is how to ensure unprofitable but
necessary community services are sustained. Many of the governments in Asia have
shown a greater willingness to allow their new private sector airlines to operate on
international routes rather than dismantle controls over domestic fares and over the
enforced continuation of ‘necessary’ services (Hooper 1997).
This gradualist approach to liberalisation has been labelled as ‘pragmatic’ with the
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airlines regarded as instruments of national development; the airline sector continues
to be regarded as something special (Bowen & Leinbach 1995). This approach means
that there are differences in the way the liberalisation is occurring from nation to
nation, but at the same time there are strong similarities in terms of the agents of
change, the process of reform and the outcomes. The process of reform opens the
door for new airlines, but no matter how much regulators might try to control
competition, there is an inevitable struggle for market share. Pressure builds up for
further changes and it is recognised that competition must be permitted more or less
on the basis of equal opportunity. Privatisation and multiple designation become
inevitable under the weight of market pressures.
The Australian case illustrates this and what tends to be different in Asia is that the
pace of change, once commenced, is more rapid and occurs without the opportunity
for detailed prior analysis. South Korea has adopted a form of limited competition in
which it allowed the new carrier to operate international services because it could not
compete purely on its domestic base. The Philippines exemplifies a country
concerned about the performance of its national carrier and its subsequent attempts to
privatise while fostering a liberal aviation policy. Hooper (1997) has identified a
general movement to liberalise domestic competition leading to multiple designation
in international airline markets, but South Korea and the Philippines will be examined
here to shed insights into this trend.
3.2 South Korea
Korean Air Lines commenced in 1948 and, though it was privatised as early as 1969,
it enjoyed a monopoly in the domestic market until 1988. In response to criticisms of
the services provided by Korean, the Government approved the commencement of a
second domestic carrier, Asiana Airlines. Owned by the Kumho Corporation, a large
Korean enterprise with diversified interests, Asiana commenced services in December
1988 on six routes using leased Boeing 737-400 aircraft. However, it placed orders
for B767-300 and B747-400 aircraft early in 1989 as part of a stated plan to operate
regional and long-distance international services in 1990. Asiana complained that it
could not compete unless granted access to international routes. The Government had
continued to control airline fares and, together with the competition from a dominant
Korean Air, there was a danger that the new pro-competition policy would founder.
In 1989, the Government lifted restrictions on travel abroad by its citizens and the
resulting boom in traffic provided an opportunity for Asiana to be granted
international rights. In October of 1990, the Minister of Transportation announced a
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new policy according to which Korean Air would fly all domestic routes and any
international routes within the limits of air services agreements negotiated by the
Korean Government. Asiana’s rights to compete on domestic routes was reaffirmed
and it was permitted to fly to the United States, Japan, South East Asia and South
West Asia. Special consideration was to be given should Asiana wish to fly to China,
Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Laos and Cambodia.
Double tracking was to be permitted on routes where the traffic level reached 200,000
passengers a year. Asiana was to be granted capacity rights in the ratio of 2:1 on new
routes to Japan, South East Asia and South West Asia, but Korean Air would be given
a 2:1 capacity differential on routes to the USA. However, neither airline was
satisfied with the new policy and the Government was immediately placed under
pressure to review its position (Hong 1992). The ratio of traffic on new routes to the
USA and Southwest Asia subsequently was changed to 1:1. Also, Asiana was given a
priority allocation of three flights per week on the Korean Air routes which satisfy the
double tracking rule which was reduced to 150,000 passengers each year (Oum &
Taylor 1995).
In effect, the Government attempted to cross-subsidise the domestic operations with
its international policy. However, Asiana had to enter some highly competitive routes
without having a clear strategic advantage. Its lack of a significant profile as an
international airline placed it at a disadvantage in the market and there was no
evidence that it could produce with lower costs than its rivals. In its first five years,
Asiana lost US$292 million and only turned in its first profit in 1994 with a surplus of
US$37 million. The airline’s cause was not helped when one of the B737-400 aircraft
crashed in 1993.
The domestic market had grown to 21 million passengers in 1995 and was
maintaining an annual growth rate in excess of 14% due to increasing affluence, low
air fares, and congested roads. The Government relaxed its regulation of domestic
fares, requiring only that the airlines notify it of changes. However, the airlines
consider they are obliged to operate unprofitable services and Korean voluntarily
reduced its already low fares by 5% across-the-board in 1995, explaining the decision
as ‘duty’ (Mackey 1996).
In 1995, Asiana had a fleet of 39 aircraft and it served 42 destinations with a traffic
base that placed it as one of the 50 largest airlines in the world. Nevertheless, Korean
Air Lines regards its main competition to be the large international carriers from other
countries as Asiana is too small to have a major impact. Asiana claims that the loss on
domestic services in 1995 was US$20 million (Whitaker 1996), and both Korean and
Asiana continue to cross-subsidise domestic services. Korean Air Lines is predicting
this will become more difficult as a result of the over-capacity that has resulted from
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the Government’s liberal approach to international aviation and the increased activity
by large, foreign carriers. Price discounting appears to be inevitable and this is likely
to occur at a time when the national economy enters an uncertain period (Mackey
1996). In this environment, government policy is likely to be under further pressure.
3.3 The Philippines
Philippine Airlines (PAL) started as a domestic carrier in 1941 and built up its
international services throughout the 1950 by cross-subsidising the expansion from
profits from its lucrative domestic market (Brimson 1985). Operating under private
control until 1977, the Government of the Philippines took a 99.7% share. The airline
re-equipped just as traffic was about to fall with the second oil price shock and
suffered continuing setbacks in its operating environment. By the 1990’s, the airline
had accumulated losses of US$300 million and there was mounting criticism of the
airline’s international and domestic operations.
As an archipelago consisting of more than 7,000 islands, the Philippines is an ideal
market for an airline and in 1994 PAL carried in excess of 4 million passengers a year
with load factors of 80 percent or greater. Between 1985 and 1994, the market had
grown at the average annual rate of 4.1 percent, but the forecast was that traffic would
grow by 12 percent per annum to 2000 provided sufficient capacity were provided.
The Government accepted there was a need for change and scope for competition.
The first step was the privatisation of PAL in 1992, followed by deregulation of entry
to the domestic market and adoption of a liberal approach to international aviation in
1994. However, the Civil Aeronautics Board retains control over domestic fares and
requests for fare increases have to be approved by the Philippine Congress (Hewitt
1996).
Star Asia Airways was the first new entrant into the domestic market, but its strategy
has been to operate to secondary airports and to grow at a modest rate. Other airlines
to commence shortly afterwards were Grand International Airways, Cebu Pacific, Air
Philippines and Silangan Airways, and two others, Asian Spirit and Corporate Air
were about to enter in 1996. Grand Air was flying to Hong Kong and Seoul by mid-
1996 and it has plans to fly to Taipei, Tokyo, Beijing, Vietnam, Brunei, Jakarta,
Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Bangkok. Cebu and Air Philippines also have
announced their international ambitions.
Wealthy entrepreneurs have financed the new carriers, but they have recruited former
PAL executives and they have plans for strong growth backed by an aggressive
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approach to competition. Grand Air is particularly strong and has captured a
significant share of some important domestic markets (Ballantyne 1996a). One reason
for this is the airline is setting a high standard for domestic service with superior
check-in facilities and hot meals in-flight. Air Philippines claims that it has load
factors of 76 percent and that it has exceeded its growth projections in 1996 and it
expects to have 16 aircraft by 1997, including three leased B737s, serving at least 12
domestic ports and regional international flights.
PAL’s privatisation has not proceeded smoothly. The airline continued to incur losses
after privatisation, particularly when faced with additional competition under the
Government’s new policies. Management inherited a large debt and an ageing fleet
with high maintenance costs which, in part, arose because of a lack of uniformity in
aircraft and engine choices. The Government had sold 67% of the stock in the airline
to PR Holdings, Inc., a consortium that later came under the control of Lucio Tan in
1994. Reputed to be the wealthiest person in the Philippines, Tan has set about
restructuring the ailing carrier. He brought in a team of financial advisers from his
own business empire and sought advice from academics and international airlines
including SAS, Thai International and British Airways. The airline is attempting to
lift its on-time performance while reviewing its fleet and network. At the same time,
the accounting and computing systems are being overhauled. Tan committed a
substantial amount of his own capital but is seeking additional finance to overhaul the
fleet.
In serving 38 cities and towns with a fleet of 22 aircraft, PAL dominates the domestic
market, but the Government’s competition policy has resulted in greater capacity,
productivity and performance improvements by the incumbent, and expansion in the
market. PAL’s major complaint now is that it must fly unprofitable routes ‘in the
public interest’. When it deregulated entry in 1995, the Government specified that the
new carriers should operate some of the less profitable routes with thin traffic
densities, but the Civil Aeronautics Board has not policed this requirement. PAL
complains that it is at a disadvantage because of this and has asked that it be given the
freedom to withdraw from routes.
PAL has invested in night lighting facilities at some airports in an attempt to gain
better utilisation of its fleet and the Government has permitted some increases in fares
while allowing PAL to import fuel for its domestic operations, a saving estimated at
US$20 million per annum (Ballantyne 1996a). The Government of the Philippines
had opposed Tan’s control of the former state carrier, but the matter seems to have
been resolved in mid-1996 and the new competitive regime is about to enter a new
phase.
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4. Implications for Australia
The developments in Asia have several implications for Australia. First, the growth in
traffic means there are opportunities for Australian airlines on routes to and from
Australia, but also on routes within and beyond Asia. However, it is not clear on what
terms access to these markets would be granted. During 1996, for example, Qantas’s
carriage of passengers originating in Hong Kong to Bangkok and Singapore became
the subject of a bitter dispute. A second matter to consider is that Asian airline
markets have attracted major North American and European carriers. Airlines from
the USA have enjoyed a considerable degree of freedom to carry passengers from
Japan to other parts of Asia, but generally the Asian nations have pursued a
protectionist attitude. British Airways has negotiated an air services agreement with
Singapore that allows it broad scope to form a regional hub. Hub-and-spoke airline
systems have been one of the notable outcomes of competition. A problem for
Australia is that it is an end-point and while the Australian traffic might have some
role in determining where in Asia hubs might develop the outcome might be that
services to and from Australia are relegated to a feeder role.
The attempts of these larger airlines to develop global networks through their
alliances with other ‘mega’ airlines adds to the concern about what part they will play
in Asia, principally because the smaller carriers, including Australian airlines, could
be relegated to being minor players (Bureau of Transport and Communications
Economics 1994). The protectionist approach taken by some of the key nations in
Asia has discouraged alliances with their own carriers, but even Japan was unable to
sustain its opposition under the pressures of competition from the European and North
American airlines.
The USA has been using these alliances as a negotiating lever to forge ‘open skies’
agreements with other nations (Jennings 1996). Singapore and Taiwan have entered
into such arrangements and Malaysia has signalled an interest in following suit. The
choices open to any particular country might not be whether they will agree to
alliances, but whether they can promote competition between major alliance groups.
One strategy for smaller nations is to promote a single strong airline that maximises
influence within the alliance they join (Oum & Taylor 1995), but this is at variance
with all of the other pressures leading to multiple designation. The dynamism of the
airline market in the Asia-Pacific region is placing pressure on the bilateral system
from within as more and more new airlines seek a role in international markets. It is
not so much a question of whether a more liberal regime will emerge in Asia as it is a
question of timing and form, whether liberalism will appear within regional blocs or
whether it will be a relatively open arrangement.
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In April of 1997, a single aviation market will be created in the European Union and
airlines from member economies will be able to operate anywhere within the bloc.
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Paraguay recently signed a regional agreement
(Mercosur bloc) and this has been mooted as a step towards a pan-American ‘civil
aviation network governed by a single multilateral regional air transport agreement’
(Pereira 1996). The single aviation market for Australia and New Zealand is another
example of a regional bloc, and ICAO has identified 50 different groupings of states
that are, or could become, involved in the regulation of aviation. Clearly the potential
exists to form a similar arrangement in Asia particularly to cater for the new airlines.
In 1994, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand signed a joint Memorandum of
Understanding under which regional flights would be encouraged within the
‘Northern Growth Triangle’. Each of the signatories was free to designate two airlines
that would be permitted to operate whatever capacity they wish between secondary
airports on a scheduled or charter basis, carrying passengers and/or cargo. In
situations where this arrangement was at variance with air services agreements, the
latter were to take precedence. Since then, the Philippines and Brunei have joined and
the bloc is known as BIMP-EAGA (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines - East
Asia Growth Area) and it covers a market with a potential of 250 million air travellers
(Ballantyne 1996b). Discussions between Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia,
Laos and Yunnan Province of China have mooted another aviation bloc. Although
Japan has a more protectionist approach to aviation policy, it attempted in 1995 to
create an Asian aviation forum to achieve regional cooperation on aviation policies
(Ballantyne 1995).
When the Mercosur bloc was formed, there was immediate interest in the
development of new north-south routes. Within the group of member countries, a
liberal approach appeared conducive to the establishment of new services, but an
added attraction is that these would operate free of direct competition from the
powerful carriers from the USA. There is a distinct possibility that the formation of
blocs could result in greater competition within, but the barriers could rise for airlines
from outside the region (Ballantyne 1996b). ICAO has addressed this matter, but
there is insufficient experience with blocs to make any firm predictions. Protectionist
blocs with large internal markets could use their power to the disadvantage of smaller
parties. Spurred on by competition from within the bloc, efficient airlines drawing
upon a large market could become dominant carriers on inter-bloc routes (Nuutinen
1992). Indeed, the Director General of the International Air Transport Association
was reported to have urged African nations to pursue a strategy of liberalising
competition within a bloc to promote efficiency and development, but to use the bloc
as a countervailing force to deal with powerful external interests (Vandyk 1995).
However, if blocs were to adopt an open approach to membership at the same time as
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promoting liberal competition within the group, they could become the driving force
of multilateralism.
5. Concluding Comments
The lessons learned in Australia over the past decade have been that traffic growth,
competition and the growing influence of the tourism sector have been powerful
forces working against the status quo of regulation. However, once scope for
competition is introduced it becomes a wedge for additional pressures to adopt a more
liberal approach. Along the way, domestic deregulation, multiple designation in
international markets, privatisation and code-share agreements as part of broader
airline alliances become irresistible. Australia is not alone and it could be cast among
the ‘pragmatic’ Asian countries, albeit having started the process of liberalisation
earlier than most and having advanced further along the path. Seen in this light, the
Australian experience offers some insights into the process of change occurring in
Asia. Yet Asia holds a key to the future health of an Australian airline industry and to
the continued competitiveness of the Australian tourism industry. For this reason, it is
imperative that opportunities in forums such as APEC to ensure access to Asian
markets on favourable terms. That Australia has been supporting moves in APEC to
support a more liberal approach, subject to fair and equal opportunity is significant.
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